The production of documents constitutes one of the principal means of proof in civil and commercial disputes in Qatar, particularly where the relevant documents lie in the possession of the opposing party or a third party beyond the applicant’s reach. This framework is grounded in Articles 228–233 of the Civil and Commercial Procedure Law and interacts with a set of special rules relating to confidentiality and data protection, in light of the principles affirmed by the Court of Cassation—most notably in Judgment No. 545 of 2020.

Article 228entitles a litigant to compel the opposing party to produce any document that is material to the dispute, provided that one of three conditions is satisfied:

1. the law permits such a request;

2. the document is jointly held by both parties; or

3. the opposing party has relied upon the document during the course of the proceedings.

To be admissible, the request must, to the extent possible, identify the document, outline its contents, specify the fact it is intended to prove, provide indications showing that the document is in the opponent’s possession, and setout the legal basis obliging its production. Otherwise, the request is formally inadmissible.

Article 229 regulates the court’s approach when the opposing party denies the document or remains silent. Thus, if the applicant substantiates his request, or if the opposing party admits or remains silent, the court shall order immediate production of the document. However, if the opposing party denies the existence of the document and the applicant fails to provide sufficient evidence, the denying party may be challenged to take a decisive oath affirming that the document does not exist, or that he has no knowledge of its existence or location, and that he has neither concealed it nor neglected to search for it with the intention of preventing his opponent from relying upon it.

Conversely, Article 230 prescribes a direct evidentiary consequence for refusal ornon-production: the copy of the document submitted by the applicant shall be deemed identical to the original, or the applicant’s statements regarding the form and content of the document may be accepted to the extent the court finds them credible. These consequences do not, in themselves, resolve the dispute, but they provide the applicant with a persuasive evidentiary advantage within the broader body of evidence.

Article 233establishes a general obligation upon any person holding material relevant to the disputed right to present it for examination when necessary for deciding the case. Conversely, it allows the court to reject production if the holder demonstrates a “legitimate interest” justifying refusal. Such an interest is neither defined nor exhaustive; it is assessed by the judge according to the nature of the document, the relevance of the portion sought to be withheld to the disputed right, and the reality of the potential harm arising from disclosure.

In undertaking this assessment, the judge may be guided by laws such as the Personal Data Privacy Protection Law No. 13 of 2016 or Banking Secrecy regulations, without these constituting a direct or exclusive exception to Article 228. Within this framework, the submission of redacted or partial copies becomes permissible only in a narrow scope, provided the redaction does not affect the essence of the evidence or its material portion.

The Court of Cassation, in Judgment No. 545 of 2020, articulated significant practical principles. It quashed a judgment that had ignored an explicit request to compel the opposing party to produce documents allegedly in its possession. The Court held that such a request constitutes a means of proof that the trial court must examine and address; that the oath provided for in Article 229 and the procedural consequence under Article 230 form part of the evidentiary system without being decisive on their own; and that imposing on the applicant the burden of producing a document alleged to be in the possession of the opponent constitutes a deficiency in reasoning.

The Court further affirmed that neither the taking of the oath nor the refusal to produce the document is dispositive in itself, as the court retains its full discretion to evaluate the totality of evidence and reach the conviction it deems appropriate.

The judgment also clarified that where the dispute may be resolved on the basis of other sufficient evidence, the court may rely on the inferential effects of Article230 without treating refusal as an independent ground for judgment. However, where the document is essential and irreplaceable, and the opponent persists in withholding it after all means of compulsion have been exhausted, the court may give weight to the applicant’s account within the limits permitted by law.

In practical terms, a scenario may arise in which a party submits a request fulfilling the requirements of Article 228, the court is persuaded of the document’s materiality and issues an express order compelling production, yet the ordered party refuses to comply, invoking irrelevance or confidentiality.

In such circumstances, the issuance of the production order signifies that the court has already determined the document to be material to the dispute. Accordingly, any subsequent reliance on irrelevance will have no effect unless based on new considerations. Claims of confidentiality are evaluated under Article 233, in light of the connection between the redacted portion and the disputed right, and the reality of the alleged interest or harm. Where a “legitimate interest” is established, the court may modify the order or accept an intermediate solution such as a redacted copy.

The court may rely on the inferential consequences under Article 230 where other evidence suffices to decide the case. However, where the document is central to the dispute and no alternative exists, persistent refusal may lead the court to give greater weight to the applicant’s version within the limits set by law.

Conclusion

An analytical reading of Articles 228–233 demonstrates that the procedural principle is the full production of the document whenever it is material to the dispute, and that non-production is recognized only within the boundaries and effects established by Article 230. The sole exception permitting the submission of redacted or partial copies is the one set out in Article 233, which allows the holder to establish a “legitimate interest” justifying incomplete disclosure, provided such redaction does not affect the substantive portion of the evidence or its material relevance.

This leads to the conclusion that the scope of permissible redaction remains inherently narrow, and its assessment is inseparable from the nature of the document and the reality of any harm arising from disclosure. Such assessment must be balanced against the opponent’s right to proof and the legislative purpose underlying Articles 228 and 233. Judicial discretion in this context does not operate on the basis of a mere assertion of confidentiality, but on an objective evaluation of the connection between the withheld portion and the core of the disputed right.

Accordingly, the possibility of submitting redacted copies is contingent upon demonstrating a genuine interest rooted in the nature or sensitivity of the document, and remains subject to the trial judge’s discretion in light of the special rules relating to confidentiality—without prejudicing the right of defence or the court’s fundamental mandate to ascertain the truth.

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