The Civil and Commercial Procedures Law, along with the procedural legislation derived from it, has long constituted the cornerstone of achieving justice in all its forms, ensuring fair trials and due process. While substantive laws embody the essence of justice in content and substance, procedural laws represent the means and pathway to realizing it. The principal purpose of procedural legislation is to provide a flexible and effective instrument whose provisions are precise, comprehensive, and adaptable — enabling the judge to apply the law to legal relationships in a manner that brings judicial truth as close as possible to factual truth.

In this context, precautionary (or provisional) measures occupy a central position within the procedural system, serving as a fundamental safeguard to protect the debtor’s assets, preserve the general security of creditors, and prevent the conceal mentor dissipation of assets before obtaining an enforceable title. For this reason, most comparative legal systems have codified such measures and expanded their scope of application.

In line with this approach, the Qatari legislator, under Law No. (13) of 1990 promulgating the Civil and Commercial Procedures Law, adopted a comprehensive framework regulating provisional and precautionary measures in Book Three of the Law. The legislator empowered the creditor to take such measures even before obtaining an enforceable instrument. The same law also regulated the attachment of assets held by third parties on behalf of the debtor (Articles 445–472), there by strengthening the creditor’s general guarantee and securing their legal position.

However, the enactment of the Judicial Enforcement Law No. (4) of 2024 marked a substantial departure from this approach, as Article (4) of the new Law expressly repealed Book Three of the Civil and Commercial Procedures Law. At the same time, the Judicial Enforcement Law did not include any corresponding provisions to replace the repealed chapters or to preserve the creditor’s ability to secure their general guarantee over the debtor’s property before obtaining a final enforceable judgment. Instead, the new Law limited its scope to regulating enforcement procedures only after the existence of an enforceable title, confining precautionary measures to the case of non-final judgments (Article 8).

This legislative omission represents an unjustified departure from a well-established legislative approach that the Qatari legislator had maintained for decades. It also contradicts the prevailing trend in modern civil law systems, which recognize the creditor’s right to take precautionary measures to protect their general guarantee even prior to the issuance of an enforceable title. Moreover, such a gap allows debtors to dispose of or conceal their assets, thereby weakening the creditors’ legal standing and undermining the intended legal protection.

The divergence between the repealed provisions of the Civil and Commercial Procedures Law and those of the Judicial Enforcement Law is evident when comparing Articles (398) and (401) of the former Book Three. Article (398) granted the creditor the right to impose precautionary attachment over the debtor’s assets if the debtor had no fixed domicile in Qatar, or if the creditor had serious reasons to fear the debtor’s flight or concealment of assets. Article (401) further allowed such attachment even in the absence of an enforceable instrument, upon order of the enforcement judge.

Similarly, Articles (445) and (446) of the repealed Book Three empowered creditors to impose attachment on assets held by third parties on behalf of the debtor, again without requiring an enforceable title, provided that an order was issued by the enforcement judge to maintain such attachment until an enforceable title was obtained.

To prevent thein definite continuation of such attachment, the subsequent provisions of the same Book obliged the creditor to initiate judicial proceedings against the debtor within a specified period, culminating in the issuance of the enforceable title that would allow the conversion of the precautionary attachment into an enforceable one.

However, following the promulgation of the Judicial Enforcement Law No. (4) of 2024, Article (4) explicitly repealed Book Three of the Civil and Commercial Procedures Law, thereby eliminating the entire framework governing precautionary attachment of the debtor’s assets — both directly and through third parties — in cases where no enforceable title existed. Consequently, the legislator should have, in pursuit of the same legislative objective, incorporated into the new Law provisions regulating precautionary procedures available to creditors during the period between the maturity of the debt and the acquisition of an enforceable instrument.

Upon reviewing the provisions of the Judicial Enforcement Law, it becomes clear that the Law entirely lacks such regulation. The only reference to precautionary attachment appears in Article (8), which provides that judgments subject to appeal are not enforceable, but precautionary measures may be taken in relation thereto. Furthermore, Article (36) authorizes the enforcement judge — once an enforceable title exists — and prior to its service on the debtor, to initiate precautionary attachment procedures, including inquiries about and seizure of the debtor’s assets.

Accordingly, the precautionary attachment procedures regulated by the Judicial Enforcement Law presuppose at least the existence of a non-final judgment, unlike the repealed provisions of the Civil and Commercial Procedures Law that had allowed creditors to take precautionary action even before initiating judicial proceedings.

In light of the absence of any provisions in the Judicial Enforcement Law addressing precautionary attachment, and the full repeal of Book Three of the Civil and Commercial Procedures Law that had comprehensively regulated such measures, this situation constitutes a clear legislative deficiency and an omission of one of the key safeguards traditionally available to creditors — namely, the ability to preserve their general guarantee over the debtor’s property during litigation and even prior to its commencement.

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